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FEDERAL IJABILITY FOR TAKINGS AND TORTS:
AN ANOMALOUS RELATIONSHIP
RICHARD A. ABED *
The Fifth Amendmezt expresses a principle of fainess and not a technical
rule of procedure .... 1
I. TAKiNGS, TORTS AND THE TUCIaER ACT
- THE First Judiciary Act,- there was no provision conferring juris-
diction for suits against the United States, nor was there any provision
for suits against federal officers. In 1855, the Court of Claims was
created with authorization to hear and determine all claims against the
Government "founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation
of an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied,
with the Government of the United States. .... .3
This jurisdiction was broadened in 1887 with the adoption of the
Tucker Act,' which extended the Court's authority to include all
claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States or any law of Congrezs,
except for pensions, or upon any regulation of an Executive Department, or upon
any contract, expressed or implied, with the Government of the United States, or
for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of
which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States either
in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States were suable. . ..
The Tucker Act also gave district courts concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Claims in all cases involving certain amounts.'
Prior to the enactment of the Tucker Act, any claim brought against
the Government for damages to private property had to allege a con-
tractual relationship, either express or implied, with the Government. In
other words, the burden was placed on the claimant to show that the
property was "taken" in such a way as to give rise to some sort of
promise by the Government that it intended to pay compensation for
any benefit it acquired. Therefore, if the Government denied that it
was, in fact, taking private property, there could be no contractual rela-
tionship, since the Government could not have intended to enter a con-
tract to acquire something it already felt it owned. Further, the courts
- Member of the New York Bar.
1. United States v. Dickinson, 331 US. 745, 743 (1947).
2. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
3. 10 Stat. 612 (1355).
4. 24 Stat. 505 (187) (codified in scattered sections of 2S U.S.C.).
5. 24 Stat. 505 (1S87).
6. Originally, concurrent jurisdiction of all claims not exceeding $1,C00 vas given to the
district courts. 24 Stat. 505 (1337). The present limitation is $10,000. 2S U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2)
(1953).
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demanded that the actions by the agents or officials of the Government,
in "taking" the claimant's property, be clearly within their statutory
authority, since if they were not acting within such, they could not bind
the Government to a promise to pay. Their acts could only amount
to torts, for which the Government had not consented to be sued.
Therefore, in Langford v. United States,' the Government asserted
that its possession of the property was by virtue of its own title, and
therefore necessarily hostile to plaintiff's title claim. The Supreme Court
refused to find an implied contract to pay where the Government had
asserted that it was using its own property and had taken the property
under such claim of title, but instead found that, if the property was
private, the Government's seizure of it was tortious, and the Government
was not amenable to suits sounding in tort.8 The Court avoided the
effect of a seizure of private property by authorized agents where there
is no adverse claim of title asserted by the Government, stating:
[W]e are not called on to decide that when the government, acting by the forms
which are sufficient to bind it, recognizes the fact that it is taking private property
for public use, the compensation may not be recovered in the Court of Claims.
On this point we decide nothing.9
A few years later, in United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co.,10 plaintiff's
property was appropriated by the Government without formal proceed-
ings for the purpose of constructing a dam, in accord with a congressional
plan for improvement of the Washington water supply. The Court cited
its decision in Langford, and stated that the question reserved for deci-
sion there was now presented, since the Government did not deny that
the property was owned by the plaintiff. Therefore, the Court held that
the cause of action arose out of an implied contract, within the meaning
of the Court of Claims Act of 1855." It is interesting to note that al-
though the Court based the plaintiff's recovery on the theory of an
implied contract to pay compensation, it did assert that where property
is so acquired by the Government the fifth amendment alone might be a
sufficient basis for recovery."2
7. 101 U.S. 341 (1879).
8. "In such case the government, or the officers who seize such property, are guilty of
a tort, if it be in fact private property .... For such acts, however high the position of the
officer . . . of the government who did or commanded them, Congress did not intend to
subject the government to the results of a suit ... " Id. at 344-45.
9. Id. at 343-44.
10. 112 U.S. 645 (1884).
11. Id. at 657. See also note 3 supra and accompanying text.
12. "[T]here is no sound reason why the claimant might not . . . regard the action of
the government as a taking under its sovereign right of eminent domain, [and] demand
just compensation. . . . [W]e are of opinion that the United States, having by its agents
. . . taken the property of the claimant for public use, are under an obligation, imposed
by the Constitution, to make compensation." Id. at 656.
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As the ensuing discussion will illustrate, the theory of claims stand-
ing alone on the Constitution gradually gained strength, while the neces-
sity for finding an implied contract slowly and stubbornly subsided. This
would seem to have been the natural result of the enactment of the
Tucker Act, due to its creation of jurisdiction over claims "founded on
the Constitution." The statute was enacted some three years after the
Great Falls decision, and the purpose of the broadened jurisdiction, as
pointed out in Stovall v. United States,13 appeared to be to enable owners
of property who, like Langford, had been deprived of their property by
the United States Government or its agents, whether claiming title or not,
to recover in the Court of Claims the compensation to which the Con-
stitution seemed to entitie them. The Supreme Court, however, vacillated
and showed great uncertainty during the years following the amendment
as to whether fifth amendment cases could be founded on the Constitu-
tion alone, or whether it was still necessary to find some type of con-
tractual relationship between the claimant and the Government. Almost
forty years after the passing of the Tucker Act, Edwin Borchard felt
that the addition of the constitutional clause added nothing to the
limited jurisdiction theretofore exercised. In his opinion, the Court, up
to that time:
[A]wed by the inhibition against claims "sounding in tort" and by the traditional
view that the government's consent to be sued is to be construed as narrowly as
possible ... has given an exceedingly technical construction to the terms "taking"
and "implied contract" and a very wide interpretation to the clause "sounding in
tort." Thus the physical act of "taking" must so greatly interfere with the private
use that the injury and deprivation are permanent and substantial, hence implying
a contractual obligation to pay, and not merely temporary, or consequential, and
therefore tortios.1 4
Therefore, in Borchard's opinion, whenever there was a denial of the
owner's right to the property, either by an adverse claim of title, a
constitutional claim or the denial of an intent to pay, recovery by the
claimant would be precluded, since the taking would be merely the result
of a tortious act, for which the Government had not made itself liable.
This latter view is emphasized by the Court's decision in Hill v. United
States, handed down some six years after the passing of the Tucker
Act. There, the claimant sued the United States for the taking of certain
tracts of property for the erection of a lighthouse. The plaintiff claimed
ownership in fee simple. The Government defended on a claim of title
based upon its right as to all land below high tide, so that it had "'under
the law, for the purpose of a light-house ...a paramount right to its
13. 26 Ct. CL 226, 239-40 (1591).
14. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale LJ. 1, 30 (1924).
15. 149 U.S. 593 (1S93).
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use as against the plaintiff or any other person.' ""s The Supreme Court
refused to imply a contract to pay the value of the property, since al-
though the claimant had shown lack of consent and lack of compensation
paid, the United States had refused to acknowledge any right of property
in him. The "whole effect" of the Tucker Act was characterized by the
Court as giving jurisdiction solely over suits against the United States
"not sounding in tort."
Mr. Justice Shiras dissented, however, arguing that: (1) the fifth
amendment imposes a serious contractual obligation upon the Govern-
ment; (2) the issue of plaintiff's title is to be determined by the Court,
not the Government; and (3) private property may never be taken for
public use without making just compensation." Thus, the Justice felt
that it was only necessary to prove title in the claimant and deprivation
thereof by the Government in order to recover for a "taking" under the
terms of the fifth amendment. It seems clear that if his opinion had been
accepted by the majority of the Court, the artificial distinctions utilized
for many years in these cases would have been rendered unnecessary. It
would seem that when the Supreme Court did render a decision conclud-
ing that the facts constituted a "taking" in violation of the terms of the
fifth amendment, it was merely stating a conclusion, not really deter-
mining whether or not a contract, express or implied, actually existed.
Where the Court held that the property in question was taken under a
claim of right by the Government, and therefore refused to allow recov-
ery, it actually was informing the plaintiff that his claim was one in tort,
for which no recovery could be allowed.18 Consequently, it appeared
that the more flagrant and unjustifiable the Government's acts, the less
the tendency of the courts to hold it liable. Needless to say, this was
often criticized as a less than commendable principle of law."9
Thus, for a number of years after the adoption of the Tucker Act, the
Supreme Court not only clung to the idea that the right of recovery arose
out of implied contract and not from the Constitution, but also main-
tained that the words in the statute, "not sounding in tort," related back
to all the categories of claims for which the Government could be sued.
Under this concept, no suit could be brought against the Government
based on the fifth amendment, if the cause of action appeared to be
tortious. 20 However, slowly but surely the Court moved towards the idea
16. Id. at 599.
17. Id. at 600, 604.
18. See Note, Grounds for Recognition of Implied Contracts Under the Tucker Act, 43
Yale L.J. 674 (1934).
19. Borchard, supra note 14, at 31.
20. Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322 (1910) ; Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163
(1894); United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1 (1889).
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that suits could be "founded on the Constitution" without regard to
whether or not they sounded in tort. In Dooley v. United States," the
Court concluded that four distinct classes of cases were contemplated
by the statute, so that the words "not sounding in tort" were referable
only to the class of cases which were for "damages, liquidated or un-
liquidated." In a subsequent decision,2-' Mr. Justice Brown, in a con-
curring opinion, stated that he felt it would be going too far to hold that
the words "not sounding in tort" should be a limitation on claims based
upon the Constitution, and concluded that "claims founded upon the
Constitution may be prosecuted in the Court of Claims, whether sound-
ing in contract or in tort .... 3
However, the idea of the necessity for an implied contract in order to
find jurisdiction under the statute lingered on. In United States v. Xorth
Am. Transp. & Trading Co., -' the Court held that the right to
bring suit for an alleged taking of a mining claim in the Court of Claims
was not based upon the fifth amendment, but "upon the existence of an
implied contract entered into by the United States . . . and the con-
tract which is implied is to pay the value of property as of the date of
the taking."2
Two years later the Court again reaffirmed the contract theory in
Portsmouth Co. v. United States,- where the claimants asserted a taking
of property by the Government due to the erection of a fort, the guns of
which had "a range over the whole sea front of the claimants' property. 27
The Court, through Mr. justice Holmes, concluded that the facts war-
ranted a finding that a servitude had been imposed on the property.
Hence, the case was remanded to the Court of Claims so that evidence
could be heard as to whether the acts amounted to a "taking," in which
case an implied contract would exist, whether or not this was within the
contemplation of the parties. -23
It is interesting to note that not only did the Court reaffirm the neces-
sity of finding some sort of contractual relationship between the parties
in that decision, but also inferred that if there were a claim of superior
title by the United States, there could be no contractual relationship, in
line with the theory expressed in Langford and other early cases.
Subsequently, Chief Justice Hughes, in Jacobs v. United States,"
21. 182 U.S. 222 (1901).
22. United States v. Lynah, ISS U.S. 445 (1903).
23. Id. at 475.
24. 253 U.S. 330 (1920).
25. Id. at 335.
26. 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
27. Id. at 328.
2S. Id. at 330.
29. 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
19631
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denied the necessity for finding any form of contractual relationship
between the claimant and the Government in order to allow recovery in
a case based upon the Constitution. In his opinion, the claim "rested
upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary....
Such a promise was implied because of the duty . . . imposed by the
Amendment."30
It should be noted that in Jacobs government officers had proceeded
by direct action, believing that their conduct would in no way constitute
a "taking" under the fifth amendment. The Court, therefore, overlooked
the possible illegality of the procedures used, since the project in which
they were engaged was authorized by Congress.
The requirement for a contractual relationship between the parties
finally came to an end in the historic case of United States v. Causby."
There, plaintiffs owned just under three acres of land near Greensboro,
North Carolina, on which there was a house and a number of smaller
structures which were used for raising chickens. The United States leased
the use of an airport near the plaintiff's farm, so near, in fact, that the
end of the northwest-southeast runway was less than one-half mile from
either the barn or the house. The glide path of the runway passed
directly over the farm, only some sixty-three feet above the barn. The
facts disclosed that the planes often passed over the plaintiff's property
in considerable numbers and close together, resulting in a "startling"
amount of noise. As a result of this noise, some 150 chickens were killed,
and the Court of Claims found that the final result was the destruction
of the use of the property as a commercial chicken farm. The Court of
Claims held that the property was "taken" within the meaning of the
fifth amendment. The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims and, in so doing, rejected the argument that there was
no taking of the property, since the enjoyment and use of the land was
not completely destroyed:
The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable factory site to grazing land,
an orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential section to a wheat field. Some value
would remain. But the use of the airspace immediately above the land would limit
the utility of the land and cause a diminution in its value.8 2
The Court, in reaching the above conclusion, stated that such was the
philosophy of the Portsmouth decision. 3 As in that case, the Court felt
that the damages were "not merely consequential. They were the product
of a direct invasion of respondents' domain." 34 Thus, it concluded that
30. Id. at 16.
31. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
32. Id. at 262.
33. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
34. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946).
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the character of the invasion determines liability, not the amount of
damage caused thereby, so long as "substantial" injury is shown.
On the question of the necessity of finding a contractual relationship
between the claimants and the Government, the Court held that:
We need not decide whether repeated trespasses might give rise to an implied contract.
... [Citing Portsmouth.] If there is a taking, the claim is -foundcd apon the Constitu-
tion" and uithin the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and dctcrwinle ...
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in this case is clear.35
The Court thereby established the principle that claims which are
"founded upon the Constitution" were no longer to be hedged in by the
requirement that an implied contract be established on which recovery
might be based. The question of whether the acts in question were
tortious in nature was not even discussed, although Mr. Justice Black
dissented on the ground that
the allegation of noise and glare resulting in damages, constitutes at best an action
in tort . .. but the Government has not consented to be sued in the Court of
Claims except in actions based on express or implied contract26
Therefore, Mr. justice Black, with whom Mr. justice Burton concurred,
concluded that the case should have been reversed on the ground that
"there has been no 'taking' in the constitutional sense." 37
One year later the Court handed down another important decision in
United States v. Dickinson.3 Two suits were brought under the Tucker
Act to recover for property allegedly taken by the Government pursuant
to a project to improve navigability on a river in West Virginia. As a
consequence of the raising of the river level, the plaintiffs' lands were
permanently flooded, resulting in a great deal of erosion.
The Supreme Court, in affirming a decision for the plaintiffs, rejected
any need for finding a contractual relationship between the parties in
order to allow recovery, since suits such as this "are authorized by the
Tucker Act either as claims 'founded upon the Constitution . . .' or as
arising upon implied contracts with the Government.",, The Court
emphasized that it was "immaterial" on which theory the cause of action
was based, because in any event "the claim traces back to the prohibition
of the Fifth Amendment .... 0 Thus, the mere fact that the Govern-
ment had not formally taken proceedings to condemn the property was
not sufficient to throw the burden on the plaintiffs to establish either the
contractual relationship or the exact moment when the property was
35. Id. at 267. (Emphasis added.)
36. Id. at 269-70.
37. Id. at 275.
3S. 331 U.S. 745 (1947).




actually appropriated. The Supreme Court rejected the possibility of
deciding the case based on the "shifting meanings" of a "cause of
action," choosing instead to avoid procedural rigidities, and emphasizing
that the claim was not based on a single trespass, but rather on "inroads"
that were continuous in nature.4 Therefore, as in Causby,42 it was not
alleged that the Government should be held liable for a "taking" on a
single occurrence, but rather only where such acts are repeated or perma-
nent enough in nature to deprive the claimant materially of his enjoy-
ment of the property. The mere failure of the Government to institute
formal condemnation proceedings was not to be utilized as a means of
defeating the recovery for such "taking."
Subsequent decisions by the Court of Claims have accepted Causby
and Dickinson as making it unnecessary to find that the agents of the
Government were aware that they were engaged in a "taking," so as to
imply a contractual relationship,4 3 since suits upon the Constitution are
independent of any circumstances giving rise to a contract implied in
fact.44 It has been asserted that the doctrine of the earlier cases, requir-
ing that the circumstances of the "taking" be such as to imply a contract,
"read out" of the Tucker Act the provision giving the Court of Claims
jurisdiction over claims "founded upon the Constitution. 45 However,
Causby and Dickinson have been accepted as giving that provision "full
effect."'46 Thus, the Court of Claims has accepted these decisions as
clearly establishing the principle that:
The statute by which the Government waives its sovereign immunity from suit in
certain situations, does not limit our jurisdiction to cases of contracts. Indeed, the
first named ground of our jurisdiction is upon claims . . . founded upon the Con-
stitution.... [I]n its recent decisions the Supreme Court has recognized that claims
"founded upon the Constitution" may be sued upon, whether or not the circum-
stances also give rise to a contract implied in fact.47
In allowing recovery in such "taking" cases, the courts have formu-
lated the theory that if a tortious act by the Government is repeated
and consistent enough to deprive the owner of the beneficial use of his
property, and the Government derives a benefit in some way, then there
has been a "taking" in the constitutional sense, for which the claimant
can sue under the Tucker Act. The Causby decision and those which
follow it espouse what can be termed an "expansive concept" of a
41. Ibid.
42. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
43. Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 232 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
44. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co. v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 724 (Ct. CI. 1953).
45. Fonalledas v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
46. Id. at 1022.
47. Foster v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 349, 351 (Ct. Cl. 1951). (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 31
TAKINGS AND TORTS
"taking." It would appear that where the courts have reached a decision
in such cases that there has not been a "taking," they have really said
that there has been a valid exercise of regulatory power, the consequences
of which are "damnum absque injuria."' 9 The question persists, how-
ever, as to whether, under the spirit of the fifth amendment, there should
ever be a loss of private property, because of a public purpose, which is
not compensable.
As illustrated, the courts gradually eliminated two major obstacles in
the path of claimants seeking to base a claim on the fifth amendment,
casting aside the implied contract requirement, and allowing a claim to
be litigated under Tucker Act jurisdiction even though it may sound in
tort. However, still another hurdle may block jurisdiction, since there
may well be a question in any such case whether the agents or govern-
ment officials who inflicted the damage were acting within their authority.
The Supreme Court has not clearly answered the question of whether or
not there can be recovery as a "taking" where the act done by the agent
was arbitrary. The early cases were explicit in requiring that the agents
of the Government had to be acting within their express authority in
order to impose liability upon the United States.4 9 However, in the
Causby decision the Supreme Court evaded this question, and the Gov-
ernment did not take the opportunity for questioning the agents' au-
thority for accomplishing the unintentional direct action taken. Similarly,
in United States v. Peewee Coal Co.,"0 no challenge to the authority of
the President was alleged in regard to the coal mine seizure during
World War II, although the Government's brief disclosed a lack of
specific statutory authority. Again, the Court ignored the problem.
The question remains, due to these decisions and others, how far the
theory of Cazesby can be extended. The Court of Claims has stated that
"if the Government . . . took the lands of the plaintiffs, the absence of
statutory authority to do so would not put the citizen thus imposed upon
beyond reach of relief."'" It would appear that the Causby and Peewee
Coal Co. decisions may be accepted as inferring the principle that when
a suit is brought against the United States for the "taking" of private
property in violation of the fifth amendment, recovery may be allowed
merely on the establishment of the facts that a "taking" did occur and that
the Government did in fact retain the property thus acquired. Under
this approach to the question, the authority of the taking official would
seem immaterial to the question of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.
48. Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1224 (1953).
49. E.g., Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575, SSO (1921); Hoop v. United States, 218
US. 322, 335 (1910).
50. 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
51. Fonalledas v. United States, supra note 45, at 1022.
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Due to the adoption of the Tort Claims Act 2 soon after the Causby
decision, however, there has been relatively little judicial pronounce-
ment in this area during the past fifteen years.
In United States v. Caltex, Inc.,5 3 certain property in the Philippines
was deliberately ordered destroyed in order to prevent it from falling
into the hands of the Japanese. This was clearly not a case of incidental
damages due to general regulation, nor was there any assertion that the
Government had not taken possession of the property. But, the majority
of the Supreme Court held that no compensation need be paid by the
Government to the owners, stating:
The terse language of the Fifth Amendment is no comprehensive promise that the
United States will make whole all who suffer from every ravage and burden of
war. . . . No rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from
noncompensable losses. Each case must be judged on its own facts.6'
The holding of the majority in that decision appears to be a sensible one.
However, in an extremely interesting dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas, joined
by Mr. Justice Black, asserted that whenever property is appropriated
by the Government as essential for the "common good," the fifth amend-
ment requires compensation. 55
Thus, it is possible to perceive from this dissent means by which the
Causby decision could be extended. 6 Nevertheless, the value, if any, to
be obtained from this theory would appear to be severely limited due to
the decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.67
The question involved in that monumental case was whether the Presi-
dent had acted within his constitutional power in the issuance of an order
directing the Secretary of Commerce to take over and operate the steel
mills. The seizure had been ordered for the purpose of averting a strike
during the Korean War. The district court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion, restraining the Secretary from "continuing the seizure and posses-
sion of the plants. s58 In the district court, counsel for the Secretary of
52. 60 Stat. 842 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401,
2402, 2411, 2412, 2670-80 (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
53. 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
54. Id. at 155-56.
55. "[T]he guiding principle should be this: Whenever the Government determines that
one person's property-whatever it may be-is essential to the war effort and appro-
priates it for the common good, the public purse, rather than the individual, should bear
the loss." Id. at 156.
56. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Black, who dissented here on the basis that
there was a "taking," had also dissented in the Causby case and asserted that the acts merely
amounted to tortious conduct and not to a compensable "taking." See note 36 supra and
accompanying text.
57. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
58. Id. at 584.
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Commerce had argued that the plaintiff companies would have an ade-
quate remedy at law under the Tort Claims Act, should the seizure subse-
quently be found illegal. This suggestion, being of doubtful quality, 9
however, was dropped in the Supreme Court, and the government counsel
emphasized instead 28 U.S.C. Section 1491, allowing jurisdiction in the
Court of Claims "upon any claim against the United States founded . . .
upon . . . any regulation of an executive department .... ., 11 It was
argued that no injunction should have been issued, since plaintiffs could
sue the Government in the Court of Claims for an illegal "taking," if
the seizure were finally held unlawful.
At first glance this defense has merit, since, as discussed previously,
suits against the Government may be brought in the Court of Claims
based exclusively on a claim "founded on the Constitution.""1 Further,
it has been held that it is the deprivation of a right or interest of the
former owner rather than the accretion thereof to the sovereign that
constitutes a "taking.' 1 2 For this reason, "governmental action short of
acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so com-
plete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject
matter, to amount to a taking."' 3 A "taking," therefore, need not be
permanent to give rise to a claim against the Government.
The Court was in doubt as to whether suit might be brought in the
Court of Claims for a "taking" under the Tucker Act if the seizure were
accomplished outside the President's authority. The old Langlord argu-
ment,"4 as to acts not within statutory authority, appeared in Mr. Justice
Black's opinion to the effect that injunctive relief should be granted,
since it is doubtful that damages could be recovered in the Court of Claims
for the tortious seizure of property by government officials."a This view
primarily relied on two decisions: Hooe v. United States," and United
States v. North Ant. Co. 7 In Hooe, the Court, via Mr. Justice
Harlan, stated that unless a claim be authorized by Congress, either
"expressly or by necessary implication," it is not a claim "founded upon
59. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 26S0 (195S).
60. The Steel Seizure Case, H.R. Doc. No. 534, pt. II, 33d Cong., 2d Se s, 777-73 (1952).
61. 23 U.S.C. § 1491 (195S).
62. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 373 (1945). The Supreme Court
emphasized that "tak-ing" had been given a liberal interpretation by the courts, since "in
its primary meaning, the term 'taken' would seem to signify something more than deAruc-
tion, for it might well be claimed that one does not take what he destroys. But the con-
struction of the phrase has not been so narrow.2' Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1S79).
65. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra note 57, at 584-35.
66. 218 U.S. 322 (1910).
67. 253 U.S. 330 (1920).
1963]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the Constitution," and the officers involved cannot be said to represent
the United States.68
In the North Am. Co. decision, the Court stated that the problem
of the claimant in the Hooe case did not present itself, since express
statutory authority did exist for the "taking" of the property. The Court
was of the opinion that "when the Government without instituting con-
demnation proceedings appropriates for a public use under legislative
authority private property to which it asserts no title, it impliedly
promises to pay therefore." However, Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking
for the Court, emphasized that:
[A]Ithough Congress may have conferred upon the Executive Department power
to take land for a given purpose, the Government will not be deemed to have so
appropriated private property, merely because some officer thereafter takes possession
of it with a view to effectuating the general purpose of Congress .... In order that
the Government shall be liable it must appear that the officer who has physically
taken possession of the property was duly authorized so to do, either directly by
Congress or by the official upon whom Congress conferred the power.00
It is to be lamented that the Supreme Court did not take the oppor-
tunity, since the issue was raised in the steel case, to resolve the doubts
about whether, where a "taking" is without authority, there can be a
suit based on the fifth amendment. Its failure to do so, along with its
reliance on two cases of doubtful relevance, 70 leaves the issue still in
doubt.
A statement in United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,71 appar-
ently gives support to Mr. Justice Black's views in the Youngstown case.
In Eureka, the plaintiffs claimed that an order of the War Production
Board 72 was arbitrary and without any rational connection to the war
effort. They asserted that if such regulation were arbitrary, there would
be no difference between such a case and one where the Government
68. 218 U.S. at 335.
69. 253 U.S. at 333. (Emphasis added.)
70. The Hooe case involved a contract for rent made with the Civil Service Commission,
such contract being in violation of statutes forbidding such until proper appropriations
had been made. Due to the commercial aspects of the case, the decision is of doubtful value
even in its own realm, much less in its application to the situation presented in the steel
case. In the North Am. Co. decision, the claim against the Government was treated as
necessarily based on an implied contract with the Government to pay compensation. Thils
approach, due to Causby and subsequent decisions, is no longer utilized. Further, under the
liberal trend evidenced by Causby, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the taking
officer's authority has also become irrelevant where the Government has retained the
property. Authorization decreases in importance when a contractual relationship Is not
necessary. Certainly retention of the benefits would seem to imply ratification In any agency
relationship.
71. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
72. War Production Board Limitation Order L-208, 7 Fed. Reg. 7992-93 (1942).
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consciously exercised its power of eminent domain to take for the public
use. Mr. Justice Burton stated that due to the Court's view of the case, 3
there was no need to decide that question. Nevertheless, he added that
"ordinarily the remedy for arbitrary governmental action is an injunc-
tion, rather than an action for just compensation,""4 citing the Youngstown
decision as the basis for this dictum. This statement apparently coincides
with Mr. Justice Black's views in Youngstown, but the use of the word
"ordinarily" again seems to have left the door open to a conclusion that a
claimant might recover, under some circumstances, for an arbitrary
"taking" in an action under the Tucker Act.
The question of whether the Government can preclude a suit by a
claimant "founded on the Constitution" by denying that the claimant
has title to the property involved also remains unsettled. It would appear
that the approach taken by Mr. Justice Shiras in his dissenting opinion
in the Hill case is the more reasonable and realistic one,7  since the
question of title should not, in all fairness, preclude the wronged party
from coming into court merely because the defendant alleges superior
title in itself. As has been stated by Mr. Justice Harlan:
[T]he claim to have just compensation for... an appropriation of private property
to the public use is "founded upon the Constitution of the United States." It is none
the less a claim of that character, even if the appropriation had its origin in tort....
The questions of title and appropriation are for judicial dctcrmination. Those bcrng
decided in favor of dhe claimant, the Constitution reqidres a judgincut in his fav'or.7°
As long as the courts followed the theory that a suit against the
Government, based on a violation of the fifth amendment, had to be
grounded on a contractual relationship between the parties, there was
some basis for holding that if the Government contested title, it was not
entering into such relationship in taking the property. But under more
recent cases such as Causby and Jacobs it has been established that a
claim founded upon the Constitution can stand on its own, without the
aid of a hypothetical contract conceived by the courts in order to save
the claimant's case.
Since it has been established that claims based on the Constitution are
independent of any contract, and that recovery may be had whether the
Government proceeds by informal means or through formal proceedings
or requisition, it seems that the issue of title _ hould be left up to the court
in each particular case. It is no longer relevant in such constitutional
73. The Court found that the order was a proper exercise of the Government's regulatory
power. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 16S (1953).
74. 357 U.S. at 166 n.12.
75. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
76. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 179 (1S94) (dissenting opinion). (Empha-s
added.) Mr. Justice Shiras also joined with Mr. Justice Harlan in this dissent.
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cases whether or not the Government claims that it is dealing with its own
property in regard to the jurisdictional question, for it is now unneces-
sary to find a contractual basis for the suit. Such claim of superior title
is merely a question to be judicially determined in the course of the case.
One thing is clear from the preceding discussion of suits against the
Government based on the Constitution: Regardless of whether or not
Congress originally intended to allow such suits arising due to the
tortious conduct of government agents under the Tucker Act,7 7 suits
will be entertained in many cases where such acts amount to a "taking"
of private property. Thus, it would seem erroneous to conclude, as some
observers have done, that the Tucker Act provided no remedy for claims
sounding in tort, and that the Government did not subject itself thereby
to liability for the torts or wrongful acts of its officers."
The passage in 1946 of the Tort Claims Act would appear to have
helped resolve this problem. This is especially true if the Tucker Act
and the Tort Claims Act are viewed as "mutually inconsistent and repug-
nant."7" However, the vast amount of interplay between the statutes
and the remedies they provide tends to belie any clear-cut definition as
to their coverage. Where the courts attempt to deal with claims "founded
upon the Constitution," they are obviously dealing with a concept which
belongs to the vague category of constitutional law. It is not an easy task
to reconcile this concept with our traditional categories of "tort" and
ccontract" law.
II. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE TUCICER ACT
On August 2, 1946, Congress approved Title IV of the Legislative
Reorganization Act, thereby adopting what is known as the Federal Tort
Claims Act."° This statute subjects the Government to liability for the
tortious conduct of its agents while acting within the scope of their
employment. Thus, a general policy was laid down whereby the Govern-
ment would be held responsible for torts by its employees "under cir-
cumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred."'" This action by the Seventy-Ninth Congress was
"in accord with the recommendations of many outstanding persons in the
past and contemporary political life of the United States."82
77. See 18 Cong. Rec. 622, 2676-78 (1887).
78. See Gottlieb, The Tort Claims Act Revisited, 49 Geo. L.J. 539, 573 (1961).
79. Id. at 574.
80. See note 52 supra.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).




The statute is saddled with a number of exceptions,83 and jurisdiction
to entertain suits brought thereunder is bestowed exclusively on the
district courts, although review may be had in the Court of Claims if all
appellees consent thereto in writing."4 Due to the numerous exceptions,
jurisdiction is denied under the statute to a number of common-law torts,
as well as claims arising from the "assessment or collection of any tax"
or the "detention of any goods . . . by . . . law-enforcement offi-
cer[s]. S5 Therefore, the anomalous situation has been created whereby
the Tucker Act, in allowing recovery for "takings" under the Consti-
tution, can at times give more relief for tortious conduct on the part of
government agents than can be obtained under the Tort Claims Act.
Where an injured claimant seeks redress against the Government
for an amount not exceeding ten thousand dollars and such suit is brought
in a district court, it is possible for the plaintiff to lose on his tort cause
of action (due to an exception in the Tort Claims Act) and still remain
in the court on the allegation that there had been a constitutional
"taking" of the property involved. The amount cannot exceed ten
thousand dollars, since that is the maximum for which a suit may be
brought in a district court under the Tucker Act8O But even where the
claimant seeks an amount in excess of the jurisdictional maximum under
the Tucker Act, he may, if precluded from recovery in the district court
under the Tort Claims Act, bring his action in the Court of Claims framed
as a "taking," since there is no monetary limit on such actions in that
court. An example of this course of action is Coates v. United States,8T
in which the claimants brought an action against the United States under
the Tort Claims Act in a district court, seeking damages totaling $179,540.
The suit was based on damages allegedly caused to the plaintiffs' lands
through the continuing negligent acts of defendant while changing the
course of the Missouri River. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the
"'action arises under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution... and
also under the Federal Tort Claims Act.' ,,ss The district court dismissed
the complaint, since the acts alleged fell within the "discretionary
function" exception of the Tort Claims Act. 5 The court of appeals
affirmed, but implied that the plaintiffs might have been able to succeed
had the complaint been framed so as to charge negligence in regard to
the actual labor involved in carrying out the project, and not as to
S3. 2S U.S.C. § 26S0 (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
84. 2S US.C. § 1504 (19SS).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 26S0(c) (1958).
86. 2S U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (195S).
87. 18 F.2d 816 (Sth Cir. 1950).
8. Ibid.
S9. 28 US.C. § 26S0(a) (1958).
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the executive functions which sanctioned it nor the performance of
discretionary functions which controlled it.90
The plaintiffs then brought the case before the Court of Claims under
the Tucker Act, 91 realizing that the statute, in granting jurisdiction for
"takings" under the Constitution, can give relief for some torts pre-
cluded by the exceptions under the Tort Claims Act. The petition alleged
that, in building structures to improve the navigability of the Missouri
River, the Government had caused erosion of plaintiffs' farm land and had
deposited thereon a heavy layer of sand, resulting in permanent destruc-
tion of the productivity of the land. They asked for the identical damages
claimed in the earlier case-179,540. The Court of Claims accepted
jurisdiction of the action and stated that the Government's acts were
an invasion of a permanent and continuous character constituting a taking of private
property for a public purpose for which there is an implied promise to pay just
compensation as required by the Fifth Amendment. 92
Since the claim was "of the character of a taking" and not merely a tort
claim, the court rejected the Government's contention that it was a cause
of action "sounding in tort" and therefore not within the jurisdiction of
the Court of Claims.93
A decision such as this supports the theory that the liberal trend
of the courts in determining "takings" in violation of the Constitution
has not been materially altered by the advent of the Tort Claims Act.
Rather, regardless of congressional intent, a claimant can have "two-
bites-at-the-pie" merely by a clever framing of his pleadings: first, as a
tort under the Tort Claims Act, and should this prove unsuccessful, as a
"taking" under the Tucker Act. As previously mentioned, if the claim is
for less than the ten thousand dollar limitation on Tucker Act suits in a
district court, then the plaintiff may claim either that the act was a tort
or that it amounted to a "taking." If the claim is for more than the
jurisdictional maximum, the claimant may first claim a tort in a district
court suit, and should he fail there, due to the exceptions under the Tort
Claims Act, remove his action to the Court of Claims, claiming that his
90. "It would be difficult if not impossible to point to any example of exercising and
performing discretionary functions and duties on the part of federal agencies more clearly
within the exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act than the changing of the Missouri
River under legislative and executive sanction pursuant to political and discretionary deci-
sions of the highest governmental order on which the plaintiffs have chosen to base their
claim of negligence in this case." 181 F.2d at 817.
91. Coates v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 637 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
92. Id. at 639.
93. "We attach no value to the oblique suggestion that this case may sound in tort and
thus not be within our jurisdiction. Clearly, if this is a tort claim we would not have Juris-
diction of it per se, but defendant does not assert that it is such a claim. The claim is of
the character of a taking and should be heard on its merits." Id. at 640. (Emphasis omitted.)
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property was taken through acts of government agents. This course of
action, as well as a showing that the two statutes may well provide alterna-
tive remedies which do not require an election by the plaintiff before
suit is brought under either, is well illustrated by Coates.
In Sickmanz v. United States'0 actions were brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act to recover $26,500 for damages to plaintiff's crops of
corn and soybeans alleged to have been destroyed by migratory water-
fowl. Plaintiff's complaint stated some eleven counts on which the
defendant might be held liable for plaintiff's injury, but the district
court sustained a government motion to dismiss the amended complaintP
In affirming the decision below, the court of appeals stated that the
district court was without jurisdiction to hear the case, since what the
plaintiff actually alleged was the negligence of the United States through
congressional action, rather than any lack of due care on the part of a
government employee. The court concluded that since "no allegation of
negligence was charged to any particular employee of the federal govern-
ment . . . the discretionary function exception in Sec. 26S0(a) was
applicable." 90
Therefore, once again, a plaintiff found himself unable to proceed in
prosecuting a tort claim against the Government due to the exceptions of
the Tort Claims Act. The same cause of action, however, refrained as a
"taking" in violation of the Constitution, subsequently appeared before
the Court of Claims in Bishop v. United States.17 Plaintiffs alleged that
due to the proclamation denying permission to hunt wild geese on their
land, their hunting facilities were in effect "taken." Further, the allega-
tion was made that as a natural result of the proclamation the crops were
destroyed, thus constituting a "taking" thereof.
The court had little difficulty in dismissing the first allegation, holding
no cause of action since there is no right to hunt such wild fowl
except as permitted by the state. In regard to the damage to plaintiffs'
crops, the court refused to find a "taking," stating:
Defendant has not invaded plaintiffs' property, it has asserted no proprietary right
in it. The gist of the whole matter is that Congress has passed an Act . . . which
prohibited the hunting of wild geese except as permitted by the Secretary of the
Interior, and the Secretary of the Interior has refused to give the required permis-
sion .... For this.., the Government is not liable as for a taking.0s
The court thereupon refused to find that under these facts the plain-
tiffs had suffered a sufficient deprivation of property so as to constitute
94. 1S4 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950).
95. Id. at 617.
96. Id. at 620.
97. 126 F. Supp. 449 (Ct. C1. 1954).
9S. Id. at 452.
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a violation of the fifth amendment amounting to a "taking." But Judge
Madden, in a vigorous dissent, stated that in effect the Government
had converted plaintiffs' farm into a "game preserve," and that whenever
"the accomplishment of the public purpose . . . results in the destruc-
tion of a private owner's use of his land" the fifth amendment requires
that the Government compensate the owner. 9
In Harris v. United States,' plaintiff brought an action for crop
damages sustained due to herbicide spraying on adjoining government
land. Drifting herbicide damaged plaintiff's cotton and peanut crops,
and the suit against the Government was based on the Tort Claims Act,
or, in the alternative, as a "taking" under the Tucker Act.
In regard to the allegation of negligence, seeking to impose a liability
on the Government under the Tort Claims Act, the court held that, even
though the "operational details" might be considered a nondiscretionary
function, the Government was not liable for resultant damages to
plaintiff's crops under the Tort Claims Act, since the trial court found
that the spraying had not been done negligently.1' 1
In addition, the court also refused to consider that the claimant's
property had been "taken" in violation of the Constitution merely through
a "single isolated and unintentional act of the United States."'0 " The
court felt that this was rather a tortious act for which the Government
may only be held liable on a consensual basis. In concluding that this
could only be a tort, and not a "taking," the court emphasized that it
was a single destructive act without any attempt to acquire a proprietary
interest, therefore falling short of a violation of the fifth amendment, 10
admitting, however, that the cases have never drawn a clear and certain
distinction between torts and "takings."'0 4
The court recognized that this decision would leave an injurious
wrong by the Government uncompensated, but felt that, if so, "the
deficiency lies in the limited scope of the government's tort liability."'01
Due to this limited liability of the Government as to suits for torts, a
claimant who can build a case for a "taking" out of repeated tortious
99. Id. at 453.
100. 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953).
101. Id. at 766-67.
102. Id. at 768.
103. Id. at 767.
104. "A compensable taking under the federal constitution . . . is not capable of precise
definition. And the adjudicated cases have steered a rather uneven course between a tortious
act for which the sovereign is immune except insofar as it has expressly consented to be
liable, and those acts amounting to an imposition of a servitude for which the constitution
implies a promise to justly compensate." Ibid.
105. Id. at 768.
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conduct finds himself free of the exceptions, since his claim may then
be founded on the Constitution. This is the primary reason why the
Tucker Act, in regard to tortious conduct which adds up to a possible
"taking," has remained important despite the adoption of the Tort
Claims Act. The essential problem which seems to cause the courts the
most difficulty is posed by the question of when a tort (or torts) may
amount to a "taking." In the Causby decision, the Court looked for a
deliberate, continuous or repeated act (or acts). In addition, it would
seem that the Government must derive some benefit from the transaction
in order to find that a constitutional "taking" has occurred. If these
elements are present, then it would appear to be to the claimant's ad-
vantage to bring his suit under the Tucker Act, rather than under the
Tort Claims Act. In all probability, if Causby arose now, after the
adoption of the Tort Claims Act, the result would be the same, and a
"taking" would again be found to have occurred. Again, the Supreme
Court would most likely avoid the issue as to whether there had been a
tort involved, once a permanent servitude was found to have been imposed
on the property.
In a recent district court case'00 under the Tort Claims Act, the
plaintiff alleged that he was injured by a team of horses frightened by
a low level flight made by Civil Aeronautics Administration pilots who
were obtaining data in order to establish an approach pattern for an
airport. The district court held that this was a compensable claim under
the Tort Claims Act, but it was barred by an exception to the statute.17
Its decision was reversed by the court of appeals, and the case was re-
manded so that the lower court could make a specific finding as to
whether or not there was negligence involved.
The question arises, in viewing such a ruling, of whether or not the
plaintiff might have brought the suit as a "taking" under the Causby
theory, thereby avoiding the dangers of losing the suit due to the ex-
ceptions under the Tort Claims Act. The answer would appear to be a
negative one since, although there might have been a benefit to the
Government, there clearly was not a permanent servitude imposed on the
property. Thus, this type of injury must be compensated for under the
Tort Claims Act, or not at all. The Tucker Act, even under the Causby
theory, cannot be extended this far. At least that much appears to be
clear at this time.
106. Dahlstrom v. United States, 223 F.2d 819 (Sth Cir. 1956).
107. See 2S U.S.C. § 26S0(a), prohibiting suits based upon "the exerciss or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a




III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There would seem to be little basis on which to dispute the conclusion
that
it was not the purpose or intent of the [Federal Tort Claims Act] . . . to usurp or
displace the previously existing remedy in contract nor to give the plaintiff having
a contract claim against the Government an alternative right of suit in tort. 108
However, the fact must be kept in mind that a suit against the Govern-
ment for a "taking" is no longer considered contractual in nature, but
rather stands on its own as a claim "founded on the Constitution."
Therefore, it would seem that the general conclusion that "the con-
tractual responsibility of the United States under the Tucker Act ex-
cludes tort liability" 09 is greatly oversimplified.
As evidenced by the materials presented above, the interplay of the
two statutes in the area of torts and "takings" is quite extensive, and
the mere fact that Congress may not have so planned their application
is not sufficient grounds for ignoring the problem. Not only are the
courts allowing a claimant with a tortious claim against the Government
to waive such tort and proceed under the Tucker Act in some cases, but
will, in others, allow the same cause of action to appear both in the Court
of Claims, for a "taking," and in a district court, for a tort. As illustrated
by the Coates case," 0 a plaintiff who has lost his suit in a district court
due to an exception under the Tort Claims Act was able to move over to
the Court of Claims and win on the same cause of action for a "taking"
as a claim "founded on the Constitution." It appears superfluous to
add that this much neglected area of the law needs attention.
One possible remedy would be a repeal of the exceptions to the Tort
Claims Act. It seems obvious that had the Government been properly
suable in tort over the last one hundred years, the need for deviously
concocted causes of action in order to gain jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act would not have been necessary, at least in the vast majority of cases.
Since there are, however, a number of ramifications in any such proposal
which are beyond the scope of this discussion, this point will not be
stressed in detail. It is merely pointed out here that it is largely due to
these exceptions"' that the Tucker Act has continued to play such an
important role in regard to cases against the Government which seem
clearly tortious in nature. To those who have reservations about the
wisdom of subjecting the Government to such general liability in tort,
reference should be made to the New York approach to the problem."-
108. Gottlieb, supra note 78, at 574.
109. Ibid.
110. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
112. "The state . . . waives its immunity from liability and action and . . . assumes
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There should be no instance where private property has been appro-
priated for public use, to any degree, for which the owner is not properly
compensated. To achieve this purpose, a new general statute should be
adopted, the guiding principle of which should be that whenever a person
has been deprived of the full enjoyment of his property by the Govern-
ment, then compensation should be made, regardless of how the cause
of action is framed. The essential question should be whether or not the
owner has been deprived of a right or interest in his property, not the
accretion of a right or interest to the United States. There should be no
exceptions to the Government's liability under such statute, for the
spirit, if not the letter, of the fifth amendment is clear. No injured
citizen should see his rightful recovery dashed on the rocks of "sovereign
immunity" because of his inability to cope with the "shifting meanings"
of a "cause of action." The Constitution was intended to "preserve
practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories.11' 3 No proper
claim should fail because it must find a niche somewhere within the
sphere of the traditional concept of tort and contract and, in addition,
the applicable statute.
Under the terms of the new legislation, no clain founded on the fifth
amendment should have to depend, in order to succeed, on the fact that
the government agent was acting within his express authority. This issue
should be immaterial to such claims. The only important issues should
be whether the plaintiff can prove title to the property, and whether the
evidence discloses that a benefit was retained by the United States. The
question of retention of such benefit should be liberally construed, so
that it relies primarily on whether or not the servitude imposed is
permanent in nature, e.g., flooding, as opposed to merely temporary, e.g.,
a single airplane flight. If a permanent "taking" is found to exist, then a
benefit should be implied and compensation should be paid to the owner.
Where an officer of the United States has exceeded his authority, causing
a "taking" of private property, it is the public at large that receives the
benefit, not the individual agent, and therefore, it is the public at large,
through the government treasury, that should bear the cost. The question
of authorized activities may play a necessary role in tort law, but it has
no place in reference to "takings" under the fifth amendment.
Furthermore, it should be irrelevant whether or not a claim brought
for a "taking" in violation of the fifth amendment sounds in tort. The
basis for such suits should be neither tort nor contract, but rather a
separate cause of action, created expressly to carry out the principle
liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the fame rules of
law as applied to actions... against individuals or corportion ..... I -N.Y. Ct. CL Act § S.
113. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 743 (1947).
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embodied in the fifth amendment. If the claim, in the opinion of the
court, appears merely to be based on a tortious act by a government
official, and not sufficient to create a constitutional "taking," then the
claimant should be compelled to seek his redress under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. But no case should be dismissed, where there has been
a benefit to the United States and a diminution of the owner's enjoy-
ment of his property, merely because an agent of the Government
was acting tortiously or beyond his authority. It is the Government's
gain, not the agent's acts, which should control jurisdiction.
Finally, no suit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the
Government sets up a claim of adverse title against a claimant. Title
should be one of the essential questions for judicial determination in any
"taking" case, and not a defense by which the Government can prevent
a suit from being heard on its merits.
The principle to be followed was clearly established by the fifth
amendment: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." Unfortunately, the amendment established
a principle only, without providing the remedy by which an injured
claimant could seek his "just compensation." Because it is not self-
executing, the onus of finding a means by which to base a claim on the
amendment has fallen on the injured claimant. The fifth amendment
should be interpreted as a consent, in itself, in suits brought against the
Government for any "taking" of property privately owned. Proper pro-
cedures should be adopted so that an injured citizen can pursue his
remedy swiftly and surely. As stated by Mr. Justice Brewer,
all [questions] . . . which run along the line of the extent of the protection the
individual has under the Constitution against the . . . government . . . [are] of im-
portance; for in any society the fulness and sufficiency of the securities which surround
the individual in the use and enjoyment of his property constitute one of the most
certain tests of the character and value of the government." 4
The right is clear; the time has arrived to make the remedy equally
lucid.
114. Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893).
